Ath. Suppose any one were in the same way to express hisadmiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like,he would praise them under the idea that through them he wouldattain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.
Meg. He would.
Ath. Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is onecommon desire of all mankind?
Meg. What is it?
Ath. The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible-at anyrate, things human-may come to pass in accordance with his soul"sdesire.
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. And having this desire always, and at every time of life, inyouth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for thefulfilment of it.
Meg. No doubt.
Ath. And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for themwhat they ask for themselves.
Meg. We do.
Ath. Dear is the son to the father-the younger to the elder.
Meg. Of course.
Ath. And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the fatherprays that he may not obtain.
Meg. When the son is young and foolish, you mean?
Ath. Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat ofyouth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, underthe influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursedthe unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having asense of right and justice, will join in his father"s prayers?
Meg. I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or bein a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wishmay be at variance with his reason. But every state and everyindividual ought to pray and strive for wisdom.
Ath. Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said atfirst, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with aview to wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought toorder all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there werefour virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aimof legislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especiallythat which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest-I meanwisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in theirtrain. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I sayonce more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that theprayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in theopposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive mywords in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will find, Isuspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause ofthe ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, norignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers orof their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to their generaldegeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most importanthuman affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be thecase, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out anddemonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends, in thecourse of the argument.
Cle. Pray go on, Stranger;-compliments are troublesome, but wewill show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words,for we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in whicha freeman best shows his approval or disapproval.
Meg. Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.
Cle. By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.
Ath. Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say thatthe greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now,as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator mustendeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to theutmost of his power.
Cle. That is evident.
Ath. Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. Ishould like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me inwhat I am about to say; for my opinion is-Cle. What?
Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which henevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embracesthat which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreementbetween the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soulis, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, becauseaffecting the great mass of the human soul; for the principle whichfeels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or populacein a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion,or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just asin the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers andthe laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings havetheir habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather thereverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whetherin individuals or in states. You will understand, Stranger, that Iam speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance ofhandicraftsmen.
Cle. Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.
Ath. Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that thecitizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind ofauthority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, eventhough he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts ofaccomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite areto be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, theyknow neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men ofsense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how canthere be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There isnone; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said tobe the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who livesaccording to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is thedestroyer of his house and the very opposite of a saviour of thestate: he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom. Let this, then,as I was saying, be laid down by us.
Cle. Let it be so laid down.
Ath. I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And what are the principles on which men rule and obey incities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What arethey, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authoritywhich is always just-that of fathers and mothers and in general ofprogenitors to rule over their offspring?
Cle. There is.
