Ath. Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfectin every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims,but he should press onward to the one? this he should know, andknowing, order all things with a view to it.
Cle. True.
Ath. And can any one have a more exact way of considering orcontemplating. anything, than the being able to look at one ideagathered from many different things?
Cle. Perhaps not.
Ath. Not "Perhaps not," but "Certainly not," my good sir, is theright answer. There never has been a truer method than this discoveredby any man.
Cle. I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the waywhich you propose.
Ath. Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of ourdivine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle iswhich is the same in all the four-the same, as we affirm, in courageand in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, beingone, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, myfriends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until wehave sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look,whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or inwhatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, ifwe cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly,if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive thatthis principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up yourmind that we should let the matter alone, we will.
Cle. We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear thatwe must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we shouldlike to know how you will accomplish your purpose.
Ath. Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, bequite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.
Cle. Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be.
Ast. Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take thesame view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many,or, also how and in what way they are one?
Cle. They must consider also in what sense they are one.
Ath. And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forthwhat they think?
Cle. Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.
Ath. And may not the same be said of all good things-that the trueguardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to beable to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judgingof what is and what is not well, according to nature?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth withso much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge;-to know thatthey are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? doindeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice ofthe laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour toobtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods;our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of thelaw, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not aninspired man, and has not laboured at these things.
Cle. It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent aboutsuch matters or incapable should be rejected, and that thingshonourable should be put away from him.
Ath. Are we assured that there are two things which lead men tobelieve in the Gods, as we have already stated?
Cle. What are they?
Ath. One is the argument about the soul, which has been alreadymentioned-that it is the eldest, and most divine of all things, towhich motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the otherwas an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and ofall things under the dominion of the mind which ordered theuniverse. If a man look upon the world not lightly or ignorantly,there was never any one so godless who did not experience an effectopposite to that which the many imagine. For they think that those whohandle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanyingarts of demonstration, may become godless, because they see, as far asthey can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligentwill accomplishing good.
Cle. But what is the fact?
