Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation must,according to the plan sketched above，be met by comparing together theconclusion with its contradictory，and seeing that it shall involvethe same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner andtime.If this additional question be put at the start，you shouldnot admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both doubleand not double，but grant that it is possible，only not in such away as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case.All thefollowing arguments depend upon a point of that kind.”Does a manwho knows A to be A，know the thing called A?” and in the same way,”is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the thing called A?”
”Yes.”But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might beignorant of the fact that he is musical，so that he both knows andis ignorant of the same thing.” Is a thing four cubits long greaterthan a thing three cubits long?”Yes.”But a thing might grow fromthree to four cubits in length; ”now what is ”greater” is greater thana ”less”：accordingly the thing in question will be both greater andless than itself in the same respect.
As to refutations that depend on begging and assuming the originalpoint to be proved，suppose the nature of the question to beobvious，one should not grant it，even though it be a view generallyheld，but should tell him the truth.Suppose，however，that it escapesone，then，thanks to the badness of arguments of that kind，one shouldmake one”s error recoil upon the questioner，and say that he hasbrought no argument：for a refutation must be proved independentlyof the original point.Secondly，one should say that the point wasgranted under the impression that he intended not to use it as apremiss，but to reason against it，in the opposite way from thatadopted in refutations on side issues.
Also，those refutations that bring one to their conclusion throughthe consequent you should show up in the course of the argumentitself.The mode in which consequences follow is twofold.For theargument either is that as the universal follows on itsparticular—as (e.g.) ”animal” follows from ”man”—so does theparticular on its universal：for the claim is made that if A is alwaysfound with B，then B also is always found with A.Or else itproceeds by way of the opposites of the terms involved：for if Afollows B，it is claimed that A”s opposite will follow B”s opposite.
On this latter claim the argument of Melissus also depends：for heclaims that because that which has come to be has a beginning，thatwhich has not come to be has none，so that if the heaven has notcome to be，it is also eternal.But that is not so; for the sequenceis vice versa.
In the case of any refutations whose reasoning depends on someaddition，look and see if upon its subtraction the absurdity followsnone the less：and then if so，the answerer should point this out，andsay that he granted the addition not because he really thought it，butfor the sake of the argument，whereas the questioner has not used itfor the purpose of his argument at all.
To meet those refutations which make several questions into one，oneshould draw a distinction between them straight away at the start.Fora question must be single to which there is a single answer，so thatone must not affirm or deny several things of one thing，nor one thingof many，but one of one.But just as in the case of ambiguous terms,an attribute belongs to a term sometimes in both its senses，andsometimes in neither，so that a simple answer does one，as it happens,no harm despite the fact that the question is not simple，so it isin these cases of double questions too.Whenever，then，the severalattributes belong to the one subject，or the one to the many，theman who gives a simple answer encounters no obstacle even though hehas committed this mistake：but whenever an attribute belongs to onesubject but not to the other，or there is a question of a number ofattributes belonging to a number of subjects and in one sense bothbelong to both，while in another sense，again，they do not，then thereis trouble，so that one must beware of this.Thus (e.g.) in thefollowing arguments：Supposing to be good and B evil，you will，if yougive a single answer about both，be compelled to say that it is trueto call these good，and that it is true to call them evil and likewiseto call them neither good nor evil (for each of them has not eachcharacter)，so that the same thing will be both good and evil andneither good nor evil.Also，since everything is the same as itselfand different from anything else，inasmuch as the man who answersdouble questions simply can be made to say that several things are”the same” not as other things but ”as themselves”，and also that theyare different from themselves，it follows that the same things must beboth the same as and different from themselves.Moreover，if what isgood becomes evil while what is evil is good，then they must bothbecome two.So of two unequal things each being equal to itself，itwill follow that they are both equal and unequal to themselves.
Now these refutations fall into the province of other solutions aswell：for ”both” and ”all” have more than one meaning，so that theresulting affirmation and denial of the same thing does not occur,except verbally：and this is not what we meant by a refutation.But itis clear that if there be not put a single question on a number ofpoints，but the answerer has affirmed or denied one attribute onlyof one subject only，the absurdity will not come to pass.
