Almost all apparent solecisms depend upon the word ”this” (tode),and upon occasions when the inflection denotes neither a masculine nora feminine object but a neuter.For ”he” (outos) signifies amasculine，and ”she” (aute) feminine; but ”this” (touto)，thoughmeant to signify a neuter，often also signifies one or other of theformer：e.g.”What is this?”It is Calliope”; ”it is a log”; ”it isCoriscus”.Now in the masculine and feminine the inflections are alldifferent，whereas in the neuter some are and some are not.Often,then，when ”this” (touto) has been granted，people reason as if “him”
(touton) had been said：and likewise also they substitute oneinflection for another.The fallacy comes about because “this”
(touto) is a common form of several inflections：for ”this” signifiessometimes “he” (outos) and sometimes ”him” (touton).It shouldsignify them alternately; when combined with ”is” (esti) it should be “he”，while with “being” it should be ”him”：e.g.”Coriscus (Kopiskos) is”，but ”being Coriscus” (Kopiskon).It happens in the same way in the case of feminine nouns as well，and in the case of the so—called ”chattels” that have feminine or masculine designations.For only those names which end in o and n，have the designation properto a chattel，e.g.xulon (”log”)，schoinion (”rope”); those which do not end so have that of a masculine or feminine object，though some of them we apply to chattels：e.g.askos (”wineskin”) is a masculine noun，and kline (”bed”) a feminine.For this reason in cases of this kind as well there will be a difference of the same sort between a construction with ”is” (esti) or with ”being” (to einai).Also,Solecism resembles in a certain way those refutations which are said to depend on the like expression of unlike things.For，just as there we come upon a material solecism，so here we come upon a verbal:
for ”man” is both a ”matter” for expression and also a “word”：and so is white”.
It is clear，then，that for solecisms we must try to construct our argument out of the aforesaid inflections.
These，then，are the types of contentious arguments，and the subdivisions of those types，and the methods for conducting them aforesaid.But it makes no little difference if the materials for putting the question be arranged in a certain manner with a view to concealment，as in the case of dialectics.Following then upon what we have said，this must be discussed first.
With a view then to refutation，one resource is length—for it is difficult to keep several things in view at once; and to secure length the elementary rules that have been stated before” should be employed.
One resource，on the other hand，is speed; for when people are left behind they look ahead less.Moreover，there is anger and contentiousness，for when agitated everybody is less able to take care of himself.Elementary rules for producing anger are to make a show of the wish to play foul，and to be altogether shameless.Moreover，there is the putting of one”s questions alternately，whether one has more than one argument leading to the same conclusion，or whether one has arguments to show both that something is so，and that it is not so:
for the result is that he has to be on his guard at the same time either against more than one line，or against contrary lines，of argument.In general，all the methods described before of producing concealment are useful also for purposes of contentious argument:
for the object of concealment is to avoid detection，and the object of this is to deceive.
To counter those who refuse to grant whatever they suppose to help one”s argument，one should put the question negatively，as though desirous of the opposite answer，or at any rate as though one put the question without prejudice; for when it is obscure what answer one wants to secure，people are less refractory.Also when，in dealing with particulars，a man grants the individual case，when the induction is done you should often not put the universal as a question，but take it for granted and use it：for sometimes people themselves suppose that they have granted it，and also appear to the audience to have done so，for they remember the induction and assume that the questions could not have been put for nothing.In cases where there is no term to indicate the universal，still you should avail yourself of the resemblance of the particulars to suit your purpose; for resemblance often escapes detection.Also，with a view to obtaining your premiss，you ought to put it in your question side by side with its contrary.E.g.if it were necessary to secure the admission that ”A man should obey his father in everything”，ask ”Should a man obey his parents in everything，or disobey them in everything?”; and to secure that ”A number multiplied by a large number is a large number”,ask ”Should one agree that it is a large number or a small one?” For then，if compelled to choose，one will be more inclined to think it a large one：for the placing of their contraries close beside them makes things look big to men，both relatively and absolutely，and worse and better.
A strong appearance of having been refuted is often produced by the most highly sophistical of all the unfair tricks of questioners,when without proving anything，instead of putting their final proposition as a question，they state it as a conclusion，as though they had proved that ”Therefore so—and—so is not true”
It is also a sophistical trick，when a paradox has been laid down,first to propose at the start some view that is generally accepted,and then claim that the answerer shall answer what he thinks about it,and to put one”s question on matters of that kind in the form ”Do you think that...?” For then，if the question be taken as one of the premisses of one”s argument，either a refutation or a paradox is bound to result; if he grants the view，a refutation; if he refuses to grant it or even to admit it as the received opinion，a paradox; if he refuses to grant it，but admits that it is the received opinion,something very like a refutation，results.
