Three judges of the Court of King's Bench were tractable.But Coke was made of different stuff.Pedant, bigot, and brute as he was, he had qualities which bore a strong, though a very disagreeable resemblance to some of the highest virtues which a public man can possess.He was an exception to a maxim which we believe to be generally true, that those who trample on the helpless are disposed to cringe to the powerful.He behaved with gross rudeness to his juniors at the bar, and with execrable cruelty to prisoners on trial for their lives.But he stood up manfully against the King and the King's favourites.No man of that age appeared to so little advantage when he was opposed to an inferior, and was in the wrong.But, on the other hand, it is but fair to admit that no man of that age made so creditable a figure when he was opposed to a superior, and happened to be in the right.On such occasions, his half-suppressed insolence and his impracticable obstinacy had a respectable and interesting appearance, when compared with the abject servility of the bar and of the bench.On the present occasion he was stubborn and surly.He declared that it was a new and highly improper practice in the judges to confer with a law-officer of the Crown about capital cases which they were afterwards to try; and for some time he resolutely kept aloof.But Bacon was equally artful and persevering."I am not wholly out of hope," said he in a letter to the King, "that my Lord Coke himself, when I have in some dark manner put him in doubt that he shall be left alone, will not be singular." After some time Bacon's dexterity was successful; and Coke, sullenly and reluctantly, followed the example of his brethren.But in order to convict Peacham it was necessary to find facts as well as law.Accordingly, this wretched old man was put to the rack, and, while undergoing the horrible infliction, was examined by Bacon, but in vain.No confession could be wrung out of him; and Bacon wrote to the King, complaining that Peacham had a dumb devil.At length the trial came on.A conviction was obtained; but the charges were so obviously futile, that the Government could not, for very shame, carry the sentence into execution; and Peacham, was suffered to languish away the short remainder of his life in a prison.
All this frightful story Mr.Montagu relates fairly.He neither conceals nor distorts any material fact.But he can see nothing deserving of condemnation in Bacon's conduct.He tells us most truly that we ought not to try the men of one age by the standard of another; that Sir Matthew Hale is not to be pronounced a bad man because he left a woman to be executed for witchcraft; that posterity will not be justified in censuring judges of our time, for selling offices in their courts, according to the established practice, bad as that practice was; and that Bacon is entitled to similar indulgence."To persecute the lover of truth," says Mr.
Montagu, "for opposing established customs, and to censure him in after ages for not having been more strenuous in opposition, are errors which will never cease until the pleasure of self-elevation from the depression of superiority is no more."We have no dispute with Mr.Montagu about the general proposition.We assent to every word of it.But does it apply to the present case? Is it true that in the time of James the First it was the established practice for the law-officers of the Crown to hold private consultations with the judges, touching capital cases which those judges were afterwards to try? Certainly not.
In the very page in which Mr.Montagu asserts that "the influencing a judge out of court seems at that period scarcely to have been considered as improper," he give the very words of Sir Edward Coke on the subject."I will not thus declare what may be my judgment by these auricular confessions of new and pernicious tendency, and not according to the customs of the realm." Is it possible to imagine that Coke, who had himself been Attorney-General during thirteen years, who had conducted a far greater number of important State prosecutions than any other lawyer named in English history, and who had passed with scarcely any interval from the Attorney-Generalship to the first seat in the first criminal court in the realm, could have been startled at an invitation to confer with the Crown-lawyers, and could have pronounced the practice new, if it had really been an established usage? We well know that, where property only was at stake, it was then a common, though a most culpable practice, in the judges, to listen to private solicitation.But the practice of tampering with judges in order to procure capita; convictions we believe to have been new, first, because Coke, who understood those matters better than any man of his time, asserted it to be new; and secondly, because neither Bacon nor Mr.Montagu has shown a single precedent.
How then stands the case? Even thus: Bacon was not conforming to an usage then generally admitted to be proper.He was not even the last lingering adherent of an old abuse.It would have been sufficiently disgraceful to such a man to be in this last situation.Yet this last situation would have been honourable compared with that in which he stood.He was guilty of attempting to introduce into the courts of law an odious abuse for which no precedent could be found.Intellectually, he was better fitted than any man that England has ever produced for the work of improving her institutions.But, unhappily, we see that he did not scruple to exert his great powers for the purpose of introducing into those institutions new corruptions of the foulest kind.
